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Electric power system networks are facing major challenges because of the rapid increase in 
penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs). Reliability evaluation plays an important role in 
system analysis, design, upgrades, and operations, especially in bulk power systems. The research 
presented in this thesis focuses on the evaluation of the composite system reliability under steady 
state conditions, and also goes a step further towards assessing operational risks in real-time system 
operations using direct probabilistic analysis techniques. The thesis also examines the reliability and 
risk improvements that are accrued from penetration of DERs into the power system. 
The challenge of using analytical methods in reliability evaluation of composite power 
systems is the large computational burden involved, to examine all the possible outage events. This 
thesis presents the mathematical foundations, evaluation procedures, and reliability indices associated 
with composite power system reliability evaluation using the minimal cut set calculations. The 
objective of this approach is to evaluate reliability and risk indices for the system and for every load 
bus in the system. The performance of the system under outage condition of generators, transmission 
lines, or both, is examined by conducting an appropriate power flow study. An optimal power flow 
(OPF) is solved to find the system minimal cut sets which are then used to evaluate reliability and 
operational risk. DER units are incorporated to investigate the enhancement in system reliability and 
operational risk. The concepts and developed model are illustrated by application to the 24-bus IEEE 
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A power system consists of many components, such as transformers, transmission lines, cables, 
generators, and loads. The ability of the system to ensure delivery of electrical energy to end users 
and utility equipment is often subjected to abnormal effects, such as weather conditions, animals, 
human errors, overload, and ageing that can cause failure of a component. Table 1.1 presents a 
fourteen-year of historical outage statistics based on an eastern U.S. utility’s Outage Management 
System (OMS) Report in 1996 for some causes that led components to fail [1]. System planners and 
operators need reliability analyses information on component outages and repair rates in order to 
ensure system availability and prevent downtimes. Therefore, maintaining continuity and quality of 
supply, plays an important role in power systems design and operation. 
Table ‎1.1: Failure Causes Statistics [1] 












Animal 40 3 37 35 2 
Tree Contact 8260 29 8231 8224 7 
Overload 14 2 12 11 1 
Work Error 6 0 6 6 0 
Equipment Failure 1472 23 1449 1312 137 
Lightning 2845 147 2968 2575 123 
Accident 140 19 121 89 32 
Prearranged 7 1 6 4 2 
Customer Problem 122 9 113 109 4 
Other 355 10 345 330 15 
Total Number of 
Outages 
13261 243 13288 12695 323 
 
One aspect investigated in this thesis is the impact of distributed energy resources (DERs) on 
power system reliability. DERs are small-scale, modular, energy generation and storage technologies 






kW to 50 MW) [2, 3]. In other words, any technology that is included in distributed generation (DG) 
and demand-side measures is referred to, as DER [3]. In recent years, DERs have gained attention as 
a practical option that can significantly improve power quality and reliability without imposing 
undesirable effects on the environment. Reliability improvements can be made by implementing 
DERs in power systems which contribute by reducing transmission and distribution congestion, 
providing spinning reserve, supporting as backup supply balance, and reducing the need for additional 
system generation, transmission and distribution capacity. 
This thesis presents an optimal power flow (OPF) based algorithm to determine the minimal 
cut sets in order to assess the reliability of a composite power system with DERs. The motivation 
behind the proposed study is not only to evaluate the long-term reliability, but also to move a step 
further towards short-term operational risk assessment. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Up until the 1960’s, heuristic methods based on experimentation and rule-of-thumb method were 
used in determining the reliability of power systems [4]. One of the first recognized works on power 
system reliability is a study used to assist in cost-reliability tradeoff decisions in the design the power 
distribution systems [5]. The study considers forced outages of electrical equipment in industrial 
plants. 
 In the reliability evaluation of power systems, the states of power system components are 
usually assumed to be independent and the methods used to calculate the system reliability are based 
on the multiplication rule of probabilities [6, 7]. The application of probability techniques based on a 
series of approximate equations to calculate failure rates and component unavailabilities of simple 
systems is presented in [4, 8]. The mathematical expressions to calculate various measures of 




Calculations reveal the time of system components that will be subjected to simultaneous 
occurrences. 
 One of the most common techniques developed in power system reliability analysis is the 
Markov Chain or Markov process. However, the large computational burden involved in this method 
and the rounding errors in the results for large systems, limit the application of the Markov technique 
[9]. The application of Markov Chains in power system component transitions, from one state to 
another, for transmission system, is illustrated in [9]. Transmission components are assumed to 
operate within a 2-state (normal and stormy) weather conditions. The Markov process is used to 
determine the system failure rate and failure probabilities under the effect of storm associated failures 
on parallel facilities. 
In [10], a Markov cut set method is developed to evaluate reliability of a simple system 
comprising five components, where the minimal cut sets are determined by using enumeration 
technique and connectivity analysis. The methodology aims to evaluate the impact of failures from 
generation and transmission (HL-II) systems on the distribution systems. 
A DC-OPF based on Markov cut set method is presented in [7] to determine the impact of 
adverse weather on the long-term reliability of composite power systems. The proposed method uses 
DC-OPF approach to determine minimal cut sets which are then used to calculate the reliability 
indices. Thereafter, the Markov process is applied to the components of the determined minimal cut 
sets instead of the entire system. The obtained results are compared to the results of Monte Carlo 
simulation method. 
 The operation of power systems are subject to uncertainty including random component 
outages and uncertain load variations. In the past decade, a considerable amount of work has been 
carried out on assessing power system risk. In [11], a random fuzzy model is presented to evaluate the 
failure probability of system components due to weather, environment and other operating conditions. 




accommodate the two-fold uncertainty combining randomness and fuzziness in power system 
operations. 
In [12], a combined fuzzy and probabilistic method is developed to calculate system risk 
indices considering system component outage and load uncertainties. The fuzzy membership 
functions of system component outages are developed using statistical records whereas the system 
load is modeled using the hybrid method of fuzzy set and Monte Carlo simulation. 
In [13], several aspects of operational risk assessment of transmission systems are discussed. 
The operational risk during different types of adverse weather is estimated once the component 
failure rates are calculated. The effect of weather parameters on the momentary failure rate and 
operational risk is discussed. The minimal cut sets are arbitrarily chosen in this paper, without any 
systematic method. 
 One aspect of this thesis is to contribute towards enhancing power system reliability 
associated with DERs. Since, with the rapidly increasing penetration of renewable energy sources and 
DG technologies, it becomes extremely important to develop reliability techniques that include these 
alternative sources. The significant reliability benefits associated with renewable and clean DG 
technologies have made them an attractive option for planners and operators. 
In [14], the concepts and techniques for conventional and non-conventional energy sources 
are introduced. A comprehensive evaluation model of reliability and cost for small isolated systems 
containing renewable energy sources is presented. Simulation models are used to generate reasonable 
atmospheric data, evaluate chronological renewable power outputs and combine total energy and load 
to provide useful system indices. 
DG penetration standards in distribution systems are investigated in [15] for eleven utilities 
and industries to determine the interconnection requirements. The power flow calculations with 




taking into account different DG characteristic behavior such as voltage profile, harmonics, frequency 
control, and protection. 
A simplified method for reliability evaluation of power system with wind power is presented 
in [16]. A wind speed model for different locations is developed first, then the method is simplified 
by determining the minimum multistate representation of a wind farm model in reliability evaluation. 
The method requires historical wind speed data to be collected over many years, in order to determine 
the necessary parameters of the wind speed models for the wind farm location. 
Further, the value of DGs installed as backup generators can improve the system reliability, 
depending on the locations of DGs, the number of customers and the sizes of the loads [17]. 
Enhancement of the reliability is measured by reliability indices that include System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) and 
Total Energy Not Supplied (ENS) in [17]. The reliability analysis of a stand-alone photovoltaic 
system as a function of the hourly solar irradiation in remote areas is presented. The analysis is 
performed using Monte Carlo simulation methods taking into account the load behavior variability. 
In most of the literature reviewed in this section, it is noted that research on power system 
reliability has not considered the determination of operational risk in the same platform reliability. In 
the present work, through the use of system and nodal minimal cut sets, these two issues have been 
considered simultaneously. 
 
1.3 Objectives of this Research 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
 Evaluate the reliability of composite power systems in order to help planners to make 





 Calculate the power system operational risk in real-time in order to help operators maintain 
the delivery of electricity during system failure and disturbance events such as weather 
conditions, animals, contingency, load shedding, and human errors. 
 Investigate the impact of the DERs on reliability and operational risk and the improvements 
accrued from their penetrations. 
 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a background on power system reliability, and 
some basic definitions on failure rate, mean time to failure, repair rate, mean time to repair and 
system availability. It also presents a brief overview on composite system reliability studies 
and power system operation. 
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework for determining composite power system 
reliability and operational risk calculations using the minimal cut sets method. An OPF based model 
to find the minimal cut sets and the subsequent reliability calculations using minimal cut sets is 
described in detail. The method is applied to the IEEE Reliability Test System and the reliability and 
the risk parameters for the system are successfully obtained. 
Chapter 4 presents the power system reliability analysis improvements with DERs. The 
reliability and risk parameters are obtained considering penetration of DERs in the IEEE Reliability 
Test System, using the proposed mathematical model in Chapter 3. 







The electric power system is the most complex system to ever exist. The basic function of a power 
system is to deliver electricity to customers as reliably and as economically as possible [18]. A quick 
overview of power system reliability evaluation is presented in this chapter including some basic 
concepts of power system reliability. Thereafter, a brief review on composite generation and 
transmission system reliability evaluation is presented. This chapter also presents a brief description 
of operational risks in power system operation. 
 
2.1 Power System Reliability Basics 
Power system reliability is a measure of the ability of the system to meet the load requirements within 
acceptable standards over a period of several years. In other words, reliability can be defined as the 
probability that a system/component will perform a required function under stated conditions for a 
stated period of time [19]. According to North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), 
reliability is defined as “the degree to which the performance of the elements of the electrical system 
results in power being delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount desired.” 
Power system reliability is based on the concepts of system adequacy and system security 









System Adequacy System Security 




Power system adequacy is the ability of the system to supply all energy demand requirements 
at all times. System adequacy is associated with system steady-state conditions and offers information 
on future system behavior that can be used in system planning. Security, on the other hand, is the 
ability of the system to avoid service interruption under sudden disturbances. System security is 
associated with the dynamic and transient real-time system operations, such as generator and 
transmission line contingencies and generation uncertainties. 
Due to the large-scale and complexity of practical power systems, reliability evaluation can 
be divided into three zones, i.e., generation, transmission and distribution, organized into three 
hierarchical levels (HLs) as hierarchical level 1 (HL-I), hierarchical level 2 (HL-II) and hierarchical 
level 3 (HL-III) as shown in Fig. 2.2 [22]. Reliability studies can be applied to any zone alone, to the 
combined zones of generation and transmission (HL-II), or to the combined zones of generation, 













Reliability assessment at HL-I considers generating capacity adequacy evaluation to meet the 
total system load demand. At HL-II, reliability evaluation of the composite system comprising 


























energy to all the load points within accepted standards and in the amount desired. Studies also include 
generation rescheduling and load shedding options. An overall assessment, HL-III, considers all the 
three zones simultaneously. The reliability assessment at HL-III becomes very difficult because of the 
large-scale modeling and computation involved. Thus, the distribution system reliability studies are 
usually performed separately. 
 
2.1.1 Basic Reliability Concepts 
A. Failure Rate (λ) 
Failure rate is the probability that a component is online during a time interval R. In other words, 
it is the number of failures of a component per unit measurement of time [23]. Failure rate, as 
one of the important reliability indices, specifies the rate of system aging. It is generally 
expressed in failures per hour and often denoted by λ. A failure occurs if any component causes 
power interruption or abnormal voltage profile. 
 
B. Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) 
MTTF is the expected or average time of a component to fail. MTTF is the inverse of the failure 
rate. From Fig. 2.3, we have, 





C. Repair Rate (µ) 
The repair rate is the probability that a component is recovering and restoring to service again in 




diagnose, repair or replace, test, and resume to the system. It is generally expressed in repairs per 
hour and often denoted by µ. 
 
D. Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) 
MTTR is the expected time taken to repair a failed component. MTTR is the inverse of the 
failure rate. From Fig. 2.3, we have, 









Figure ‎2.3: System Operation and Breakdown 
 
 
E. System/Component Availability 
Availability is the probability of a system or a component of being in service and being 
operating. By modeling the system components in series and parallel as interconnections, system 
availability can be determined. 
In order to determine the component availability, let us assume that a component has two 
states: available and unavailable. The conventional two-state model, shown in Fig. 2.4 is adopted 














Figure ‎2.4: Two-state model 
Fig. 2.4 indicates the state transition diagram for the two-state device. The model 
includes an UP (In Service /Available) state and a DOWN (Outage/Unavailable) state. If failures 
and repairs are exponentially distributed, the probability of a component k on outage at a time t = 
T, given that it was operating successfully at t = 0 [18], is 
     
 
   
 
 
   
         (‎2.3) 
 
In steady-state condition, i.e., t = ∞, the unavailability or the Forced Outage Rate (FOR) 
of component k can be obtained [18] as, 
     
 
   
     (‎2.4) 
 
2.1.2 Fundamental Techniques Used in Reliability Evaluation 
Several techniques are developed to improve the reliability of the power system. The criteria applied 
to assess the composite system reliability can be categorized as deterministic or probabilistic [24]. 
A. The Deterministic Approach 
The deterministic approach is an old and simple method used by system planners to evaluate the 
system performance and maintain system security in different scenarios based on past 
experience. The most common deterministic method is the N-1 criterion. Based on this criterion, 




(one line or one generator) that may occur, the system will be considered reliable. The main 
advantage of the deterministic approach is its straightforwardness to implement and the easiness 
to understand. However, the difficulty to determine the degree of system unreliability, which 
fails under more than one scenario, limits the applications of this method. 
 
B. The Probabilistic Approach 
The probabilistic approach provides a better understanding of system behavior and allocation of 
resources. The benefit of using the probabilistic method is in incorporating uncertain events in 
the system. The most common types of uncertainties are the components’ state, the weather, and 
the load. Stochastic models are used to represent these uncertainties. 
The probabilistic approach is categorized as analytical methods and simulation (Monte Carlo 
simulation) methods [18]. The analytical methods represent the system behavior by mathematical 
models and evaluate the system reliability using direct numerical solutions. Some of the 
analytical methods in use are cut set, Markov, and equivalent method. The simulation methods, 
on the other hand, estimate the system reliability based on simulating a series of random 
sampling of scenarios and random behavior. 
 
2.1.3 Method of Minimal Cut Sets 
The proposed method in this thesis is based on determining the minimal cut sets for the system 
generators and lines. As defined in [20], a cut set is a set of system components which, when failed, 
causes failure of the system. System failure refers to the load interruption at any load bus of a 
composite power system. The minimum subset of any given set of components which causes system 
failure is known as a minimal cut set. The minimal cut set can be defined as a set of system 




minimal cut set has not failed, does not cause system failure, i.e., each cut set in the system is in 
series with other cuts, with parallel components inside a cut. This definition means that all 
components of a minimal cut set must be in the failure state to cause system failure. 
The unreliability or Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) of a power system can be calculated 
precisely using cut sets, as follows: 
 Step-1: Calculate the probability of failure of each component, using (2.3) and (2.4), 
for operational risk assessment and for determination of FOR, respectively. 
 Step-2: Multiply the probability of failure of each individual component that 
construct a cut set.  
 Step-3: Use cut set probabilities, in (2.5) [25], to find the probability of system 
failure, i.e., LOLP, as follows: 
    ∑    ̅ 
 
 ∑ (  ̅    ̅)  ∑  (  ̅    ̅    ̅)
        
              ̅    ̅      ̅  (‎2.5) 
 
However, determining cut set probabilities is a difficult and time-consuming exercise for 
large and complex systems which needs to consider all the cut sets. To overcome the computational 
complexity, approximations can be made in the evaluation by using the upper bound approximation 
(first term of Eqn. (2.5)) by summing the minimal cut set probabilities of system failure, as shown in 
(2.6). The results obtained with this approximation, although not very accurate, allows fast calculation 
of the LOLP of a system. The degree of inaccuracy introduced, is usually negligible and often within 
the tolerance associated with the data of the component reliabilities for a system with high values of 
component reliability. 
   







2.1.4 Reliability Example 
In order to understand the basic concept of the cut set and system LOLP evaluation, Fig. 2.5 describes 
the logical connections between components. Each block symbolizes a component, and the 
connections between components describe the state of success or failure of the system. All cut sets 
that cause a system to fail, should be identified and combined. Any subset of any given set of 
components which cause a system failure is now called a minimal cut set. In a minimal cut set, all 
components of the cut set must fail simultaneously in order for the system to fail, and hence the 
components are in parallel and the minimal cut sets themselves are in series. It is assumed that failure 







Figure ‎2.5: Minimal Cut Set Example 
 
From Fig. 2.5, the following minimal cut sets are defined: 
C1: comprising elements 1 and 2. 
C2: comprising element 3. 
From (2.5) and the reliability of the logic bridge diagram, as shown in Fig. 2.5, the system will fail 
when either minimal cut set C1 or C2 fails, science they are in series. This is mathematically 
represented as, 
            





                         
             
                                   
therefore,  
         
The same example is now solved to determine the probability of failure using the minimal cut 
set method of (2.6). The unreliability or LOLP of the system is now the summation of the minimal cut 
set unreliabilities: 
                                  
As seen from this example, the approximate method of minimal cut sets results in an outage 
probability of 0.11 whereas the exact probability is 0.109. However, the approximation method 
reduces the computational time and the quantity of analysis that is required, especially for large, 
complex system.  
 




the Cut Set 
Minimal Cut Set Failure 
Probability 
    
 ∏   
 
   
 
   1,2 0.01 
   3 0.1 







2.2 Composite Power System Reliability Evaluation 
This thesis focuses on HL-II analysis.  As mentioned before, HL-II analysis deals with composite 
power system or bulk power system reliability assessment. Composite power system reliability 
evaluation examines the ability of the system to deliver electrical energy to the bulk supply points in 
the amount desired. Components considered in a composite power system reliability study comprise 
among others, generators, transformers, lines, reactors, relays, and loads. Component outages in a 
composite system can be characterized as follows [20]:  
 
2.2.1 Independent Outages 
Independent outages are those outages of different components which does not affect the probability 
of outage of the others. Single or multiple independent outages or overlapping outages are the easiest 
to evaluate and many evaluation methods are available assuming that all the component outages are 
independent [26]. The research described in this thesis concentrates on the independent outages. 
The conventional two-state model, mentioned Section 2.1.1 (Fig. 2.4), represents the 
probabilistic behavior of most generators and lines, and the basic data required for this model are 
failure rates and repair rates. For multiple independent outages, the model adopted for reliability 
assessment can be found by combining the two-state models of each component. 
 
2.2.2 Dependent Outages 
Outages are considered dependent when their occurrences are dependent on one or more other 
outages. Usually, dependent outages are not included in reliability evaluation of composite power 
systems. Dependent outages can be classified into common mode outages and substation originated 
outages. A common mode outage occurs when one external cause results in multiple outages, while 




single lightning stroke causing tripouts of two or more circuits on a common transmission tower. 
However, substation originated outage is a forced outage caused by the failure of a component or 
more inside the substation. An example of substation originated outage is stuck-condition of breakers. 
 
2.3 Operational Risk Assessment of Power Systems 
Operational risk assessment is the probability that a system/component will perform a required 
function under stated conditions during a short period of time. Risk assessment of power systems 
cover a time scale of hours, which is called the lead time, with a known initial operational state [13]. 
The operating conditions of the system components are uncertain, which render the probability of 
outage of the components continuously changing. For instance, during severe weather, the failure rate 
of overhead lines can increase significantly. 
Risk and reliability are the two aspects of measuring the ability of the electric power system 
to meet the load requirements within accepted standards and in the amount desired. Both, risk and 
reliability are associated with each other. Higher risk means lower reliability, and vice versa. 
The first major operational risk assessment was published in 1963 by PJM Interconnection 
[27]. In this approach, the unit commitment risk is applied to the operational planning of generation 
units. A procedure is presented for determining operating reserve requirements to maintain a uniform 
level of risk in the day-to-day operation, taking into account the changing load level, the variability of 
the load, and the size of units scheduled, so that the spinning reserve capacity in any part of the 
system can be fully available in any other part of the system [27].  
 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter an attempt is made to present a brief background on power system reliability and its 




assessment hierarchical levels, and some basic reliability concepts are briefly discussed. This is 
followed by distinguishing the difference between the deterministic and the probabilistic approaches 
in evaluating the system reliability. Thereafter, an example is presented to illustrate the above 
concepts. Types of component outages in a composite power system are briefly introduced. Finally, a 
quick overview on operation risk assessment of power systems is presented. 
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Chapter 3 
Power System Reliability and Operational Risk Evaluation Using 
Minimal Cut Sets 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed previously, the main objective of composite generation and transmission system 
adequacy assessment, HL-II, is to evaluate the ability of a power system to satisfy the load 
requirements at the major load points. The  assessment  of  adequacy  in  a  composite  power system 
has  been  considered  through various system analysis tools, such as load flow calculations, 
contingency analysis, generation rescheduling, circuit overload alleviation, load shedding, etc. 
Reliability calculations are used to measure the system ability for a long-term performance 
over several years of a power system, thus covering many operational states. Reliability indices are 
used by system planners to decide on new investments in generation capacities. On the other hand, 
risk assessment of power systems covers a time scale of hours, which is called lead-time, with a 
known initial operational state. 
Risk and reliability are the two aspects of measuring the ability of the electric power system 
to meet the load requirements within accepted standards and in the amount desired. Both, risk and 
reliability are associated with each other. Higher risk means lower reliability, and vice versa. 
The reliability studies presented in this thesis are based on the minimal cur set method. This 
chapter presents a description of the determination of the system minimal cut sets using optimal 
power flow (OPF) in Section 3.2 and the determination of the nodal minimal cut sets in Section 3.3. 
The application of the proposed concepts is made using the IEEE Reliability Test System [28], which 
is discussed in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, the computation of system-wide and model reliability 
indices is presented. Section 3.6 discusses the computation of system-wide and model operational risk 





3.2 OPF Based Determination of System Minimal Cut Sets 
The system minimal cut sets are used in this chapter to evaluate the reliability and risk indices for the 
system as a whole, and for every load bus in the system. The performance of the system under the 
outage condition of generator units, transmission lines, or both, can be examined by conducting an 
appropriate OPF study. A power flow analysis can be applied to determine the system minimal cut 
sets but only an OPF is able to determine the nodal minimal cut sets (Section 3.3). Thus, the OPF is 
used in this thesis to determine both the system and nodal minimal cut sets. The first order outage 
evaluation checks the outage of one component in the system at a time. The second order outage 
evaluation examines the simultaneous outage combination of two components. The third and higher 
order outage evaluations can similarly be defined. The calculation of the indices consists of 
determining which combinations of component outages result in interruptions and then calculating the 
probability of these contingencies occurring. 
 Figure 3.1 presents an overview of the method applied to determine the system-wide and 
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The flow-chart to determine the minimal cut sets of a composite power system up to the 
preset order is described in Fig 3.2 [7]. The algorithm proceeds as follows: 
 Step-1: Select a set of 1st order system components, i.e., each generator or each line is 
considered individually as a 1
st
 order system component. 
 Step-2: Execute the OPF model (discussed in Section 3.2.1) with one component 
from the above selected set of 1
st
 order system components on outage. 
 Step-3: If there is a loss of load at any bus (      ) then this component is a 1
st
 
order minimal cut set. If not, then execute Step-2 with the next component on outage 
from the selected set, and check for loss of load at any bus. Continue until all 
components are individually considered to be on outage and hence from the complete 
list of 1
st
 order minimal cut sets. 
 Step-4: Select a set of 2nd order system components, i.e., a combination of two 
elements, which may be a generator-generator, generator-line, or line-line, pair. 
Execute Step-2 and Step-3 to determine the complete list of 2
nd
 order minimal cut 
sets. 
 Step-5: Continue Step-1 to Step-4 for higher order of system components. In this 
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3.2.1 The OPF Model 
The OPF problem is a static, non-linear optimization problem, which determines a set of variables 
from the network state, load data and system parameters [29]. Optimal values are computed in order 
to achieve a certain objective such as generation cost or transmission line power loss minimization 
subject to a number of equality and inequality constraints, such as generation-load balance, generator 
capacity limits and voltage magnitude limits. In reliability evaluation, the analysis of failure effects 
should be carried out after the occurrence of a system event. 
In a composite power system, after a system event occurs, e.g. the outage of a generator or 
the tripping of a transmission line, the output of generators is rescheduled first. If the violation of 
system constraints cannot be alleviated, load shedding is executed. 
In order to simulate the OPF model and determine the minimal cut sets, there is a need to 
select an appropriate objective function for the OPF. In this work, one of the commonly used 
objectives, the loss minimization objective, is used for the purpose. However, this class of problems is 
new, and other objective functions can be tested to examine their import on the minimal cut sets, 
which is left as future work. 
The objective function to minimize the active power loss in the transmission system is given 
below: 













  (‎3.1) 
The above equation is subjected to the following equality and inequality constraints: 
 
1) Nodal active and reactive power balance: 
The model active and reactive power balance is ensured by the standard power flow equations 
(3.2) and (3.3) which are modified to include      and       which are optimization variables. 
These variables are necessary, as they represent the amount of unsecured active and reactive 




















sin                     (‎3.3) 
2) Limits on bus voltages: 
 iii VVV                                                                                      (‎3.4) 
 
3) Limits on active and reactive power generation: 
 iii
PgPgPg                                                                             (‎3.5) 
 
 iii
QgQgQg                                                                             (‎3.6) 
4) Capacity limits of transmission line: 
 jiji SS ,,                                                                                        (‎3.7) 
 
5) Limits on load interruption: 
                                                                                               (‎3.8) 
 
                                                                                               (‎3.9) 
 
3.3 Determination of Nodal Minimal Cut Sets 
In order to understand the reliability of serving customers at a specific load bus, it is necessary to 
determine location specific reliability indices. A method is proposed to obtain the select set of 
minimal cut sets that result in loss of load at a particular bus. The flow-chart for determining the set 
of nodal cut sets is shown in Fig. 3.3 and the algorithm is discussed below: 




 Step-2: Choose a minimal cut set and execute the OPF (Section 3.2.1) with the associated 
components of the cut set on outage. If there is a loss of load at bus i (      ) then this is a 
minimal cut set of bus i. If there is loss of load at more than one bus, then this cut set is a 
minimal cut set for all such buses. 




Input load flow dattar, construct Y-bus matrix, run 
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per Fig. 3.2
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3.4 IEEE Reliability Test System 
In this section, reliability studies are performed on the IEEE Reliability Test System [28] as shown in 
Fig. 3.4. This system is specially designed by IEEE Task Force on Power System Reliability and it 
provides all relevant data of lines, generators and outages. The considered test system is programmed 
and executed in the GAMS environment [30]. There are 32 generators ranging from 12 MW to 400 
MW in capacity, 24 buses, and 38 transmission lines and transformers. The system has an annual 
peak load of 2850 MW and 580 MVAr, and the installed generation capacity is 3405 MW.The 
transmission network consists of 138 kV and 230 kV voltage levels. Relevant data of IEEE 
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3.5 Reliability Calculations Using Minimal Cut Sets 
3.5.1 Component Unavailability in Steady-State 
Table 3.1 presents the failure rate (λ) and the repair rate (µ) of each generator of the IEEE Reliability 
Test System, as given in [28]. The resulting steady-state unavailabilities or FOR of each generator are 
calculated using (2.4) and are given in Table 3.1. 
Table ‎3.1 Generators Data and Steady-State Unavailability 
 
 
Similarly, Table 3.2 presents λ and µ values for each transmission line of the IEEE Reliability 
Test System [28]. The corresponding FOR of each component, calculated using (2.4), is listed along 
with. 
Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) FOR Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) FOR
Number 1/hr 1/hr Number 1/hr 1/hr
1 Gen # 1 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.00E-01 17 Gen # 17 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 2.00E-02
2 Gen # 2 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.00E-01 18 Gen # 18 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 2.00E-02
3 Gen # 3 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 2.00E-02 19 Gen # 19 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 2.00E-02
4 Gen # 4 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 2.00E-02 20 Gen # 20 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 4.00E-02
5 Gen # 5 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.00E-01 21 Gen # 21 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 4.00E-02
6 Gen # 6 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.00E-01 22 Gen # 22 9.09E-04 6.67E-03 1.20E-01
7 Gen # 7 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 2.00E-02 23 Gen # 23 9.09E-04 6.67E-03 1.20E-01
8 Gen # 8 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 2.00E-02 24 Gen # 24 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E-02
9 Gen # 9 8.33E-04 2.00E-02 4.00E-02 25 Gen # 25 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E-02
10 Gen # 10 8.33E-04 2.00E-02 4.00E-02 26 Gen # 26 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E-02
11 Gen # 11 8.33E-04 2.00E-02 4.00E-02 27 Gen # 27 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E-02
12 Gen # 12 1.05E-03 2.00E-02 5.00E-02 28 Gen # 28 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E-02
13 Gen # 13 1.05E-03 2.00E-02 5.00E-02 29 Gen # 29 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E-02
14 Gen # 14 1.05E-03 2.00E-02 5.00E-02 30 Gen # 30 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 4.00E-02
15 Gen # 15 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 2.00E-02 31 Gen # 31 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 4.00E-02




Table ‎3.2 Transmission Lines Data and Steady-State Unavailability 
 
3.5.2 System Unreliability Using Minimal Cut Sets 
In this subsection, the system minimal cut sets are identified by using the method discussed in Section 
3.2 and the results are presented in Table 3.3. The minimal cut sets are determined up to the third-
order, in this thesis, in order to keep the computational burden within reasonable limits, and without 
any loss of generality. 
The first-order minimal cut sets are determined considering a single component outage at a 
time, either a generator or a transmission line. For each outage case, if there is loss of load at a bus, 
the particular component on outage, becomes a first-order minimal cut set. As observed from Table 
3.3, there is no first-order minimal cut set in the IEEE Reliability Test System. 
The second-order minimal cut sets are determined considering the simultaneous outage of 
two components of the system, i.e. two generators, two transmission lines, or one generator and one 
transmission line. For each outage case, if there is loss of load at a bus, the two components on 
simultaneous outage form a second-order minimal cut set, if neither of them is a first-order minimal 
cut set. 
Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) FOR Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) FOR
Number 1/hr 1/hr Number 1/hr 1/hr
1 Line # 1 2.74E-05 6.25E-02 4.38E-04 20 Line # 20 4.57E-05 9.09E-02 5.02E-04
2 Line # 2 5.82E-05 1.00E-01 5.82E-04 21 Line # 21 5.94E-05 9.09E-02 6.53E-04
3 Line # 3 3.77E-05 1.00E-01 3.77E-04 22 Line # 22 5.59E-05 9.09E-02 6.15E-04
4 Line # 4 4.45E-05 1.00E-01 4.45E-04 23 Line # 23 4.34E-05 9.09E-02 4.77E-04
5 Line # 5 5.48E-05 1.00E-01 5.48E-04 24 Line # 24 3.77E-05 9.09E-02 4.14E-04
6 Line # 6 4.34E-05 1.00E-01 4.34E-04 25 Line # 25 4.68E-05 9.09E-02 5.15E-04
7 Line # 7 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 1.51E-05 26 Line # 26 4.68E-05 9.09E-02 5.15E-04
8 Line # 8 4.11E-05 1.00E-01 4.11E-04 27 Line # 27 4.68E-05 9.09E-02 5.15E-04
9 Line # 9 3.88E-05 1.00E-01 3.88E-04 28 Line # 28 4.00E-05 9.09E-02 4.39E-04
10 Line # 10 3.77E-05 2.86E-02 1.32E-03 29 Line # 29 3.88E-05 9.09E-02 4.27E-04
11 Line # 11 3.43E-05 1.00E-01 3.42E-04 30 Line # 30 3.65E-05 9.09E-02 4.02E-04
12 Line # 12 5.02E-05 1.00E-01 5.02E-04 31 Line # 31 6.16E-05 9.09E-02 6.78E-04
13 Line # 13 5.02E-05 1.00E-01 5.02E-04 32 Line # 32 4.00E-05 9.09E-02 4.39E-04
14 Line # 14 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 1.51E-05 33 Line # 33 4.00E-05 9.09E-02 4.39E-04
15 Line # 15 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 1.51E-05 34 Line # 34 4.34E-05 9.09E-02 4.77E-04
16 Line # 16 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 1.51E-05 35 Line # 35 4.34E-05 9.09E-02 4.77E-04
17 Line # 17 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 1.51E-05 36 Line # 36 3.88E-05 9.09E-02 4.27E-04
18 Line # 18 4.57E-05 9.09E-02 5.02E-04 37 Line # 37 3.88E-05 9.09E-02 4.27E-04




In Table 3.3, it is seen that there are 20 second-order minimal cut sets where both 
components are generators, 8 minimal cut sets where both components are transmission lines, and 3 
second-order minimal cut sets of generator-line pairing. The corresponding unavailability, grouped by 
component and order of minimal cut sets is also presented in Table 3.3. 
In the same way, the third-order minimal cut sets for the IEEE Reliability Test System are 
also determined and the corresponding unavailability, grouped by component and order is presented 
in Table 3.3. 
Once the unavailabilities are obtained for each minimal cut set group, the system unreliability 
can be determined using (2.6). In the IEEE Reliability Test System under study, the system 
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3.5.3 Nodal Unreliability Using Minimal Cut Sets 
As discussed in Section 3.3, the algorithm can be applied to find the nodal unreliability or model 
LOLP using minimal cut sets. For illustration, in Table 3.4 the set of components in minimal cut sets, 
the minimal cut set unavailabilities, and the corresponding unavailability grouped by component and 
order of minimal cut sets are specifically identified for Bus-8 of the test system. The minimal cut sets 
of Bus-8 are the subsets of the system minimal cut sets. As seen in Table 3.4, there is one minimal cut 
set of the second-order of generators (23, 32) and it is a subset of the system minimal cut sets. The 
nodal unreliability or LOLP of Bus-8 is determined to be 0.034262393 in the same way that the 
system unreliability or LOLP is obtained in Section 3.5.2 using (2.6). 
In the IEEE Reliability Test System under study, the bus-wise unrelaibilities (LOLPs) and the 
loss of load at all load buses in the system are calculated as shown in Table 3.5, Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6. 
It is noted that Bus-8 has the highest unserved load in the system but the nodal unreliability index 
(model LOLP) at this bus is comparatively low and hence the risk of loss of load is low. On the other 
hand, Bus-3 has a low value of unserved load but a higher unreliability index (higher LOLP), 




Table ‎3.4: Computation of Nodal (Bus-8) Reliability using Minimal Cut Sets  
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Figure ‎3.5: Bus-Wise Unreliability (LOLP) Indices 
 













3 28.086 0.087241337 13 0.369 0.000125
4 43.99 0.094343378 14 20.182 0.066774809
5 3.17 0.035982497 15 0.27 0.0144
6 18.496 0.06815277 18 4.483 0.014403272
7 3.805 0.001608419 19 4.198 0.009603269












































3.6 Operational Risk Calculations Using Minimal Cut Sets 
3.6.1 Component Unavailability in a Lead Time of 10 hours 
In Table 3.6, λ and µ of each generator of the IEEE Reliability Test System [28], and the resulting 
component unavailabilities for a lead-time of 10 hours, calculated using (2.3), are presented. The 
lead-time of 10 hours intends to examine the probability of a component to be unavailable at the end 
of the hour-10, assuming that the component is available at the start of that lead-time. 
Table ‎3.6: Generator Data and Unavailability after 10 Hours 
 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the of generator unreliabilities as a function of the lead-time. It is assured 
that the unavailabilities are linearly varying with the lead-times. 
Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) Unavailability Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) Unavailability
Number 1/hr 1/hr After 10 hrs Number 1/hr 1/hr After 10 hrs
1 GEN#1 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.99E-02 17 GEN#17 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 3.13E-03
2 GEN#2 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.99E-02 18 GEN#18 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 3.13E-03
3 GEN#3 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 4.50E-03 19 GEN#19 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 3.13E-03
4 GEN#4 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 4.50E-03 20 GEN#20 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 9.17E-03
5 GEN#5 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.99E-02 21 GEN#21 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 9.17E-03
6 GEN#6 2.22E-03 2.00E-02 1.99E-02 22 GEN#22 9.09E-04 6.67E-03 8.76E-03
7 GEN#7 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 4.50E-03 23 GEN#23 9.09E-04 6.67E-03 8.76E-03
8 GEN#8 5.10E-04 2.50E-02 4.50E-03 24 GEN#24 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 3.97E-03
9 GEN#9 8.33E-04 2.00E-02 7.52E-03 25 GEN#25 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 3.97E-03
10 GEN#10 8.33E-04 2.00E-02 7.52E-03 26 GEN#26 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 3.97E-03
11 GEN#11 8.33E-04 2.00E-02 7.52E-03 27 GEN#27 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 3.97E-03
12 GEN#12 1.05E-03 2.00E-02 9.49E-03 28 GEN#28 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 3.97E-03
13 GEN#13 1.05E-03 2.00E-02 9.49E-03 29 GEN#29 5.05E-04 5.00E-02 3.97E-03
14 GEN#14 1.05E-03 2.00E-02 9.49E-03 30 GEN#30 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 9.17E-03
15 GEN#15 3.40E-04 1.67E-02 3.13E-03 31 GEN#31 1.04E-03 2.50E-02 9.17E-03







Figure ‎3.7: Generator Unavailability as a Function of the Lead-Time 
 
Similarly, Table 3.7 presents λ and µ values for each transmission line of the IEEE Reliability 
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Group A: G1, G2, G5 and G6 Group B: G9-G14, G20-G23 and G30-G32 






Table ‎3.7: Transmission Lines Data and Unavailability after 10 Hours 
 
 It is seen from Fig. 3.8 that the transmission line unreliabilities increase with lead-times, 
though they are no longer linearly dependent, unlike the generators. 
 
 
Figure ‎3.8: Transmission Line Unavailability as a Function of the Lead-Time 
 
Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) Unavailability Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) Unavailability
Number 1/hr 1/hr After 10 hrs Number 1/hr 1/hr After 10 hrs
1 LINE#1 2.74E-05 6.25E-02 2.04E-04 20 LINE#20 4.57E-05 9.09E-02 3.00E-04
2 LINE#2 5.82E-05 1.00E-01 3.68E-04 21 LINE#21 5.94E-05 9.09E-02 3.90E-04
3 LINE#3 3.77E-05 1.00E-01 2.38E-04 22 LINE#22 5.59E-05 9.09E-02 3.67E-04
4 LINE#4 4.45E-05 1.00E-01 2.81E-04 23 LINE#23 4.34E-05 9.09E-02 2.85E-04
5 LINE#5 5.48E-05 1.00E-01 3.46E-04 24 LINE#24 3.77E-05 9.09E-02 2.47E-04
6 LINE#6 4.34E-05 1.00E-01 2.74E-04 25 LINE#25 4.68E-05 9.09E-02 3.07E-04
7 LINE#7 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 8.52E-06 26 LINE#26 4.68E-05 9.09E-02 3.07E-04
8 LINE#8 4.11E-05 1.00E-01 2.60E-04 27 LINE#27 4.68E-05 9.09E-02 3.07E-04
9 LINE#9 3.88E-05 1.00E-01 2.45E-04 28 LINE#28 4.00E-05 9.09E-02 2.62E-04
10 LINE#10 3.77E-05 2.86E-02 3.28E-04 29 LINE#29 3.88E-05 9.09E-02 2.55E-04
11 LINE#11 3.43E-05 1.00E-01 2.16E-04 30 LINE#30 3.65E-05 9.09E-02 2.40E-04
12 LINE#12 5.02E-05 1.00E-01 3.17E-04 31 LINE#31 6.16E-05 9.09E-02 4.05E-04
13 LINE#13 5.02E-05 1.00E-01 3.17E-04 32 LINE#32 4.00E-05 9.09E-02 2.62E-04
14 LINE#14 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 8.52E-06 33 LINE#33 4.00E-05 9.09E-02 2.62E-04
15 LINE#15 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 8.52E-06 34 LINE#34 4.34E-05 9.09E-02 2.85E-04
16 LINE#16 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 8.52E-06 35 LINE#35 4.34E-05 9.09E-02 2.85E-04
17 LINE#17 1.26E-06 8.33E-02 8.52E-06 36 LINE#36 3.88E-05 9.09E-02 2.55E-04
18 LINE#18 4.57E-05 9.09E-02 3.00E-04 37 LINE#37 3.88E-05 9.09E-02 2.55E-04

























3.6.2 System Operational Risk Using Minimal Cut Sets 
In this subsection, the system minimal cut sets and their unavailabilities are used to determine the 
system operational risk using the proposed method. The results obtained are presented in Table 3.8. 
The operational risk is determined using equation (2.3), for a lead-time of 10 hours after the event, 
assuming that the system loads remain the same during this period.  The same set of minimal cut sets, 
obtained in Table 3.3 are used for this purpose. 
Figure 3.9 presents the plots of system operational risk as a function of the lead-time. It is 
observed that the operational risk is rather low up to 4 hours of lead-time but thereafter increases 
exponentially. This implies that in order to prevent the outages to turn into major catastrophe, there 
need to be restored within typically 4 hours. The system operational risk is found to be 0.001755074 





Table ‎3.8: Computation of System Operational Risk using Minimal Cut Sets  
 
 
Component Set of Components in Minimal Cut Set Minimal Cut Set Unavailability at t=10 hr
Unavailability by Componenet 
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Figure ‎3.9: System Operational Risk as a Function of the Lead-Time Neglecting Changes in System 
Operational Conditions 
 
3.6.3 Nodal Operational Risk Using Minimal Cut Sets 
The minimal cut sets and their unavailabilities are used to determine the nodal operational risk for 
bus-8 of the test system, which are listed in Table 3.9. The calculations have also been carried out to 
find all the unavailabilities of the minimal cut sets and the nodal operational risk of all load buses that 




































Component Set of Components in Minimal Cut Set Minimal Cut Set Unavailability at t=10 hr
Unavailability by Componenet 
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Figure ‎3.10: Nodal Operational Risk as a Function of the Lead-Time (Bus 8) Neglecting Changes in 
System Operational Conditions 
 
























Lead-Time in Hours 
Bus No.









3 28.086 0.001144302 13 0.369 8.552E-07
4 43.99 0.001222769 14 20.182 0.000715437
5 3.17 7.66341E-06 15 0.27 0.00007665
6 18.496 0.000864114 18 4.483 7.67208E-05
7 3.805 4.88885E-06 19 4.198 7.21861E-05






Figure ‎3.11: Bus-Wise Operational Risk for Lead-Time = 10 hr 
 
Figure ‎3.12: Bus-Wise Total Loss of Load 
 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the concept of minimal cut sets is applied to evaluate the composite system and nodal 
unreliabilities. The proposed method is applied to the IEEE Reliability Test System by conducting an 
appropriate OPF to obtain the system-wide minimal cut sets. Once the component unavailabilities are 
calculated using failure and repair rates data, the minimal cut set probabilities are calculated which 

















































Whereas this chapter uses a comprehensive reliability and operational risk assessment in 
composite power systems to predict the performance of the power system over several years 
(planning) and during a specific time (operation), the next chapter introduces the impact of DERs on 




Power System Reliability Analysis with Distributed Energy 
Resources Penetration 
4.1 Introduction 
One objective of this thesis is to evaluate the improvement in power system reliability with DERs 
while satisfying network constraints. As described in Chapters 2, the power system is liable to system 
failures and disturbances, such as load shedding, contingency, weather conditions, animals and 
human errors. Therefore, maintaining reliability to deliver electricity to all points of utilization within 
acceptable standards is an important issue for systems design, planning, and operation. 
This chapter presents an analysis to study the reliability improvements from the penetration 
of DERs in composite electrical power systems. In Section 4.2, the mathematical framework for 
determining the minimal cut sets and subsequently the system reliability and operational risk, with 
penetration of DER is described. Reliability and risk calculations and results for the system and load 
buses are obtained by using the proposed method, by application to the IEEE Reliability Test System, 
and are presented in Section 4.3. Finally, in Section 4.4 a summary is presented.  
 
4.2 Mathematical Formulation 
In this section, the mathematical model for system reliability and operational risk due to the addition 
of DERs is presented. 
4.2.1 DER Unavailability 







1. Steady-state probability of failure: 
       
    
         
                  (‎4.1) 
 
2. Time-dependent probability of failure: 
            (
    
         
 
    
         
                   ) (4.2) 
In (4.2), it is assumed that the DER is only available when it is needed, which means, the 
DER serves as a supplemental reserve with a response time of    hours. This is a generic 
representation, and for     , the DER can be considered to be in continuous service. 
 
4.2.2 OPF Model 
The objective function to minimize the active power loss in the transmission system is considered, as 
given before: 













  (‎4.3) 
Some of the equality and inequality constraints are as follow: 
1) Nodal active and reactive power balance: 
The active and reactive power balance equations are modified by including       and      . 























2) Active and reactive power generation limits of the DERs: 
 iDERiDERiDER
PPP                                                                                  (‎4.6) 
 
 iDERiDERiDER
QQQ                                                                                 (‎4.7) 
The remaining constraints, discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1), are also included. 
 
4.3 Test Results 
The IEEE Reliability Test System presented in Chapter 3 is used here from the reliability analysis 
study. In this test system, it is assumed that DER1 and DER2 are located at bus 3 and bus 4, 
respectively (Fig. 4.1). The locations of the DER placements are selected based on load buses with 
lowest reliabilities as obtained in Chapter 3 that result. Further, the number of DERs and their sizes 
are arbitrarily chosen. The rated power of DER1 and DER2 are assumed to be 25 MW and 15 MW, 
respectively. It is further assumed that the failure and repair rate of the two DERs are 0.001 per hour 
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4.3.1 System Unreliability 
Failure rates (λ) and the repair rates (µ) of each component of the IEEE Reliability Test System, as 
given in [28] are presented in Chapter 3, Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Further, λ and µ for the two DERs are 
presented in Table 4.1. The unavailability of each DER is calculated using (4.1). 
The impact of the presence of DERs is observed in the formation of new combinations of 
minimal cut sets. Some of these new sets were previously lower order cut sets, and now they have 
changed to a higher order of cut sets. The loss of the older minimal cut set will no longer lead to an 
interruption. For example, a simultaneous outage of generator-23 and generator-30, or a maintenance 
operation on line-2 and line-7 will not cause a system failure anymore, because their cut sets change 
from second to third order, as shown in Table 4.3. These changes reduce the system unreliability 
(reduce LOLP), since, when the cut set order increases, its unavailability drops. The unreliability 
(LOLP) of the entire test system at a steady-state condition is now 0.1289 as shown in Table 4.3, i.e. 
the system reliability is improved from 84.38% to 87.11%. In the IEEE Reliability Test System under 
study, the bus-wise unrelaibilities are also enhanced after adding DERs to the system.  Table 4.4, Fig. 
4.3 and Fig. 4.4 show the loss of load of all load buses and their new unreliability (LOLP) indices. 
 





Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) FOR
Number 1/hr 1/hr
33 DER#1 1.00E-03 2.00E-02 4.76E-02




Table ‎4.2: Computation of Composite System Reliability with DERs using Minimal Cut Sets 
 
 
Component Set of Components in Minimal Cut Set Minimal Cut Set Unavailability
Unavailability by Componenet 
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Table ‎4.3: Bus-Wise Unreliability and Loss of Load 
 
 
Figure ‎4.2: Bus-Wise Unreliability (LOLP) Indices 
 













3 29.6892 0.073413335 13 0.202 0.000125
4 8.926 0.053176151 14 22.154 0.05007643
5 1.01 0.000769242 15 0.726 0.000192
6 9.934 0.065342417 18 7.372 0.024205612
7 3.361 0.00161214 19 4.093 0.0096












































4.3.2 System Operational Risk 
It is assumed that the DERs are independent of the standstill time and the full power of the DERs is 
available within one hour of activating a startup event. It is further assumed that the start-up failure 
probability is equal to 4%. The unavailabilities of the DERs are calculated using (4.2). For a lead time 
of 10 hours this results in an unavailability of 0.0482. The components unavailability as a function of 
the lead-time are presented in Chapter 3, Tables 3.6 and 3.7, and also shown in Figs. 3.7 and 3.8. The 
DERs unavailability as a function of the lead-time are calculated and presented in Table 4.4 and 
shown in Fig. 4.4. 
The unavailability of the minimum cut sets is calculated, as before, with the results as shown 
in Table 4.5. In Fig. 4.5, it is observed that the unavailabilities of the minimal cut sets, that have a 
DER in their combination, have reduced because of the increase in their cut set order. The impact of 
the DERs on the operational risk is calculated to be 0.0015306. The operational risk as a function of 
time is shown in Fig. 4.6. The operational risk for a lead-time of 10 hours is reduced from about 
0.175% to about 0.153% because of the penetration of the DERs. The load bus unrelaibilities are also 
improved after penetrating the DERs to the system.  Table 4.6, Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 show the loss of 

















      Figure ‎4.4: Generator Unavailability as a Function of the Lead-Time with DERs 
 
 
Element Description Failure Rate (λ) Repair Rate (µ) FOR
Number 1/hr 1/hr
33 DER#1 1.00E-03 2.00E-02 4.82E-02

























Table ‎4.5: Computation of System Operational Risk with DERs using Minimal Cut Sets 
 
 
Component Set of Components in Minimal Cut Set Minimal Cut Set Unavailability at t = 10 hr
Unavailability by Componenet 
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Figure ‎4.6: System Operational Risk as a Function of the Lead-Time with DERs Neglecting Changes 
























Lead-Time in Hours 





Table ‎4.6: Bus-Wise Operational Risk and Total Loss of Load 
 
 
Figure ‎4.7: Bus-Wise Operational Risk 
 













3 29.6892 0.000934191 13 0.202 8.552E-07
4 8.926 0.000606401 14 22.154 0.000568869
5 1.01 4.15806E-06 15 0.726 7.363E-07
6 9.934 0.000846034 18 7.372 0.000149668
7 3.361 4.93959E-06 19 4.093 7.214E-05

















































In this chapter, a reliability analysis of a composite power system with penetration of DERs, is 
presented. The mathematical model is described and it is applied to the IEEE Reliability Test System. 
Once the component failure probability is calculated using the data of the failure and repair rates, the 
minimal cut set evaluation is implemented. Network constraints are imposed to guarantee acceptable 
reliability level. Results showed the improvements and the positive impact of the DERs on power 
system reliability.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Future Work 
5.1 Summary of the Thesis 
Reliability studies play an important role in ensuring the delivery of power to customers. Developing 
more efficient and intelligent power system reliability assessment techniques plays a key role in 
improving the system reliability. This thesis presents a reliability analysis framework for a composite 
power system to assess long-term reliability of the system and a real-time risk assessment method. 
In Chapter 1, the motivation for this research is presented. This is followed by a brief review 
of the relevant literature addressing reliability assessment in power systems. Thereafter, the objectives 
of this research are presented. 
In order to have a better understanding of the reliability concepts, a brief background on some 
basics definitions and reliability evaluation methods is described in Chapter 2. The concepts are 
illustrated by application to a small complex configuration describing the logical connections between 
components. Thereafter, a brief introduction of the types of component outages in a composite power 
system (HL-II) is presented. Finally, a quick overview on operation risk assessment of power systems 
is presented. 
In Chapter 3, a comprehensive reliability and operational risk assessment method for 
composite power systems is proposed to help evaluate the system performance over several years 
(planning) and during a specific time (operation). An OPF based method is used to determine the 
minimal cut sets. Once the component failure probability is calculated using the data of failure and 
repair rates, the minimal cut set evaluation is implemented by using the approximate equations to 
evaluate system-wide and nodal reliability indices. The proposed method applied to the IEEE 




Chapter 4 examines the impact of DERs on the reliability and the operational risk of the 
composite power system based on the same approach discussed in the previous chapter. The 
mathematical model is also applied to the IEEE Reliability Test System. Results demonstrate the 
improvement and the positive impact of the DERs on the power system reliability. 
 
5.2 Main Contributions 
The main contributions of the research presented in this thesis are as follows: 
1. A comprehensive assessment framework for long-term reliability and real-time operational 
risk analysis of composite power systems is proposed. The framework determines parameters 
for reliability considering minimal cut sets of system components. The main challenge in 
implementing the method is determining the minimal cut sets. The proposed method consists 
of two steps: 
 Develop an AC-OPF to determine the minimal cut sets. 
 Use the obtained cut sets to compute the reliability and risk indices of the 
components that construct the minimal cut set using basic probability theory. 
2. The proposed method moves a step further to understand the reliability of serving customers 
at a specific load bus. Each minimal cut set, causing loss of load at a certain load bus, needs 
to be stored. The nodal reliability and risk indices are then computed after that using the 
stored minimal cut sets. 
3. In order to investigate the impact of the rapid penetration of alternative energy sources on 
reliability, DERs are penetrated to the system under study. Results show the positive effect of 




5.3 Scope for Future Work 
The possible extensions to the present work are outlined below: 
1. Apply the developed method to radial distribution systems by using system reduction 
techniques to speed up reliability calculations. There is a need to identify those areas which 
may be replaced by a simple equivalent, by reducing the number of nodes without 
significantly distorting the original system. 
2. Use alternative techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation and heuristic methods to 
incorporate the outages in composite system reliability and compare the results. 
3. Improve the Markov model to include dependent outages in reliability calculations, such as 
fluctuating weather and derated generation outages. 
4. Improve the failure rate modeling of the system components by using different distribution 
functions, such as Weibull Distribution and Curve Fitting, instead of using the Exponential 
Distributions. Based on the Exponential Distribution, multipliers are used to reflect the rate 
change of the failures. On the other hand, the goal of the Curve Fitting function, for example, 
is to find the rate values that most closely match the data. 
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Appendix A 
IEEE Reliability Test System Data 
 











MW MVAr MVAr 
1 1 20 10 0 
2 1 20 10 0 
3 1 76 30 -25 
4 1 76 30 -25 
5 2 20 10 0 
6 2 20 10 0 
7 2 76 30 -25 
8 2 76 30 -25 
9 7 100 60 0 
10 7 100 60 0 
11 7 100 60 0 
12 13 197 80 0 
13 13 197 80 0 
14 13 197 80 0 
15 15 12 6 0 
16 15 12 6 0 
17 15 12 6 0 
18 15 12 6 0 
19 15 12 6 0 
20 15 155 80 -50 
21 16 155 80 -50 
22 18 400 200 -50 
23 21 400 200 -50 
24 22 50 16 -10 
25 22 50 16 -10 
26 22 50 16 -10 
27 22 50 16 -10 
28 22 50 16 -10 
29 22 50 16 -10 
30 23 155 80 -50 
31 23 155 80 -50 
32 23 350 150 -25 
 
 




Synchronous Condenser 14 
50 Reactive 
200 Capacitive 





Table A. 3: Generator Reliability Data [28] 
Unit Size 
Unit Type 
MTTF MTTR Forced 
Outage 
Rate (MW) (Hour) (Hour) 
12 Oil/Steam 2940 60 0.02 
20 Oil/CT 450 50 0.1 
50 Hydro 1980 20 0.01 
76 Coal/Steam 1960 40 0.02 
100 Oil/Steam 1200 50 0.04 
155 Coal/Steam 960 40 0.04 
197 Oil/Steam 950 50 0.05 
350 Coal/Steam 1150 100 0.08 
400 Nuclear 1100 150 0.12 
                         
MTTF = mean time to failure = λ
-1
 
MTTR = mean time to repair = µ
-1
  
Forced Outage Rate = MTTR / (MTTF + MTTR) 
 
 





1 108 22 
2 97 20 
3 180 37 
4 74 15 
5 71 14 
6 136 28 
7 125 25 
8 171 35 
9 175 36 
10 195 40 
13 265 54 
14 194 39 
15 317 64 
16 100 20 
18 333 68 
19 181 37 
20 128 26 




















P.U. /100 MVA Base 
R X B 
1 1 2 3 0.24 16 0.003 0.014 0.461 175 
2 1 3 55 0.51 10 0.055 0.211 0.057 175 
3 1 5 22 0.33 10 0.022 0.085 0.023 175 
4 2 4 33 0.39 10 0.033 0.127 0.034 175 
5 2 6 50 0.48 10 0.05 0.192 0.052 175 
6 3 9 31 0.38 10 0.031 0.119 0.032 175 
7 3 24 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400 
8 4 9 27 0.36 10 0.027 0.104 0.028 175 
9 5 10 23 0.34 10 0.023 0.088 0.024 175 
10 6 10 16 0.33 35 0.014 0.061 2.459 175 
11 7 8 16 0.3 10 0.016 0.061 0.017 175 
12 8 9 43 0.44 10 0.042 0.161 0.044 175 
13 8 10 43 0.44 10 0.043 0.165 0.045 175 
14 9 11 0 0.02 768 0.043 0.165 0.045 175 
15 9 12 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400 
16 10 11 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400 
17 10 12 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400 
18 11 13 33 0.4 11 0.006 0.048 0.1 500 
19 11 14 29 0.39 11 0.005 0.042 0.088 500 
20 12 13 33 0.4 11 0.006 0.048 0.1 500 
21 12 23 67 0.52 11 0.012 0.097 0.203 500 
22 13 23 60 0.49 11 0.011 0.087 0.182 500 
23 14 16 27 0.38 11 0.005 0.059 0.082 500 
24 15 16 12 0.33 11 0.002 0.017 0.036 500 
25 15 21 34 0.41 11 0.006 0.049 0.103 500 
26 15 21 34 0.41 11 0.006 0.049 0.103 500 
27 15 24 36 0.41 11 0.007 0.052 0.109 500 
28 16 17 18 0.35 11 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 
29 16 19 16 0.34 11 0.003 0.023 0.049 500 
30 17 18 10 0.32 11 0.002 0.014 0.03 500 
31 17 22 73 0.54 11 0.014 0.105 0.221 500 
32 18 21 18 0.35 11 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 
33 18 21 18 0.35 11 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 
34 19 20 27.5 0.38 11 0.005 0.04 0.083 500 
35 19 20 27.5 0.38 11 0.005 0.04 0.083 500 
36 20 23 15 0.34 11 0.003 0.022 0.046 500 
37 20 23 15 0.34 11 0.003 0.022 0.046 500 
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